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POSTHYPNOTIC TESTIMONY-WITNESS
COMPETENCY AND THE FULCRUM OF
PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
ROBERT B. FALK*
To strike the essential balance between the necessity for
presenting all relevant evidence and the demand that such evi-
dence be reliable, criminal jurisprudence is discreet in accepting
new evidentiary sources. Accordingly, scientific methods of crime
detection have gained access to the courtroom only after the ut-
most circumspection.1 This notion is manifest in the standard for
admissibility articulated by the District of Columbia Circuit, in
Frye v. United States,2 which requires that a scientific method "be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in [its]
particular field." s
* B.S., Brooklyn College of the City University of New York, 1965; J.D., Brooklyn Law
School, 1968; LL.M., New York University School of Law, 1973.
1 E. BLOCK, HYPNOSIS: A NEw TOOL IN CRInM DETECTION 22 (1976); Comment, Hypno-
sis: Understanding its Use in the Criminal Process, 11 Tax. TECH L. REv. 113, 127 (1979).
2 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
' Id. at 1014. In Frye, the court was asked to admit into evidence the results of a lie
detector test. Id. at 1013. The court rejected the testimony, stating:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experi-
mental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight
zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will
go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized sci-
entific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs.
Id. at 1014.
Despite continued controversy as to its validity, see Moenssens, Polygraph Test Results
Meet Standards for Admissibility as Evidence, in LEGAL ADmissmIrrY OF THE POLYGRAPH
14-21 (N. Ansley ed. 1975), the Frye test has been applied to various types of scientific
approaches to crime detection, see, e.g., United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508, 510 (9th Cir.
1978) (forward-looking infrared system); United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556-58 (6th
Cir. 1977) (ion microprobic analysis of human hair); People v. Cox, 85 Mich. App. 314, 317,
271 N.W.2d 216, 217-18 (Ct. App. 1978) (brevital-sodium test); People v. Smith, 110 Misc.
2d 118, 124-26, 443 N.Y.S.2d 551, 556-57 (Dutchess County Ct. 1981) (odontological identifi-
cation of bite marks); State v. Canaday, 90 Wash. 2d 808, 813, 585 P.2d 1185, 1188 (1978)
(breathalyzer); Herman, The Use of Hypno-Induced Statements in Criminal Cases, 25
Omo ST. L.J. 1, 23-25 (1964) (truth serums). For further discussion of the Frye standard,
see infra note 52.
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The subject of hypnosis presents no exception to this history
of judicial prudence.4 By virtue of the increased application of
hypnosis in the field of medicine, 5 and the concomitant increase in
society's awareness of the subject,6 there has been growing interest
in the use of hypnosis as a criminal investigatory tool.7 Perhaps the
most pervasive aspect of hypnosis is its pretrial use for the purpose
of witness recollection.8 As a result, the competency of a previously
hypnotized witness has evoked widespread as well as heated
controversy.9
4 See Comment, supra note 1, at 127; infra text accompanying notes 22-31.
' Spiegel, Hypnosis and Evidence: Help or Hindrance?, 347 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 73,
73 (1979); see infra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
' See H. SPIEGEL & D. SPIEGEL, TRANCE & TREATMENT 15-21 (1978).
7 See, e.g., Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospec-
tive Witness, 68 CALw. L. Rav. 313, 321-26 (1980); Brody, Hypnotism vs. Crime: A Powerful
Weapon-or an Abused Tool?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1980, at C1, col. 1. Hypnosis has served a
variety of criminal investigatory functions, such as enhancing witness recall, see United
States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 198 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1978); United
States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252, 281-82 (E.D. Mich. 1977), uncovering amnesic periods,
Spiegel, supra note 5, at 75, and obtaining evidence of intent, see, e.g., People v. Modesto,
59 Cal. 2d 722, 732-33, 382 P.2d 33, 39-40, 31 Cal. Rptr. 225, 231-32 (1963). Moreover, recent
recipients of special training in the induction of hypnosis include police personnel in Los
Angeles, San Antonio, Washington, D.C., and New York, as well as FBI officers, the Air
Force Special Investigations Unit, and the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Bureau of the
Treasury Department. Diamond, supra, at 313.
' See Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 236, 246 A.2d 302, 306 (Ct. Spec. App. 1968),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969); Jones v. State, 542 P.2d 1316, 1326-27 (Olda. Crim. App.
1975); supra note 7. One characteristic of a hypnotic trance is the subject's capacity to recall
events that he is unable to remember in the ordinary conscious state. E. BLOCK, supra note
1, at 17. One recent example of the use of hypnosis as an aid for recall was in the much
publicized murder of a cellist in the Metropolitan Opera House. In that case, a ballerina
who had seen a man with the victim was hypnotized for purposes of inducing an adequate
description. Brody, supra note 7, at C1, col. 1.
9 State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 644 P.2d 1279, 1279 (Ariz. 1982) (en banc)
(supplemental opinion); Brody, supra note 7, at 1, C2, col. 6. Since a hypnotic subject is
prone to suggestion, see, e.g., Putnam, Hypnosis and Distortions in Eyewitness Memory, 27
INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERImENTAL HYPNOsIs 437, 444 (1979), much of the criticism of hyp-
nosis' law enforcement use focuses on the potential "contamination" of the subject's mem-
ory, Brody, supra note 7, at C2, col. 6; see Diamond, supra note 7, at 333-39. Dr. Martin
Orne, professor of psychiatry at the University of Pennsylvania, has said that "[d]uring a
trance, people are more likely to say what they think their questioners want to hear,
whether it is true or not." Brody, supra note 7, at C2, col 6. Thus, it is not unusual for a
witness to "recall" a story that supports the theory of those investigating a case. As Dr.
Herbert Spiegel describes it, the subject becomes an "honest liar." Spiegel, supra note 5, at
78; see United States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252, 281-82 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Putnam,
supra, at 444.
A second focal point of the criticism surrounding hypnosis is that investigators, rather
than experienced and expert hypnotists, most often perform the hypnosis in criminal inves-
tigations. See Brody, supra note 7, at C2, col. 5.
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This Article addresses whether the testimony of a witness who
has undergone hypnosis to refresh his recollection should be ad-
missible in a criminal trial. Initially, the Article traces the scientific
and jurisprudential history of hypnosis. It then examines the man-
ner in which the various jurisdictions presently treat the issue. Fi-
nally, the Article concludes that the testimony of a previously hyp-
notized witness should be admissible, provided there is compliance
with certain procedural safeguards.
HYPNOSIS' SCIENTIFIC AND JURISPRUDENTIAL HISTORY
Despite the abundance of attempts at defining hypnosis, it is
not a concept susceptible of ready definition. 10 According to Dr.
Herbert Spiegel of Columbia University, the hypnotist-patient re-
lationship is "characterized by the patient's nonrational submis-
sion and relative abandonment of executive control to a more or
less regressed, disassociated state."'1 In the clinical situation, this
regression is actively instigated and knowingly enhanced by the
hypnotist.12 This "structured form of aroused concentration ...
10 See H. ARONS, HYPNOSIS IN CRINuAL INVESTIGATION 11 (1967). Although hypnosis has
never been defined adequately, there have been a number of attempts at describing its na-
ture. See Note, The Admissibility of Testimony Influenced by Hypnosis, 67 VA. L. REv.
1203, 1206 (1981). In 1923, Pawlow wrote that hypnosis is a partial sleep state. See Pawlow,
The Identity of Inhibition with Sleep and Hypnosis, 17 Sci. MONTHLY 603, 607 (1923).
Professor Ernest Hilgard identified seven observable characteristics of the hypnotic trance,
including increased suggestibility, amnesia as to what transpires during the hypnotic state,
tolerance for reality distortion, and heightened selective attention and inattention. See E.
HILGARD, THE EXPERIENCE OF HYPNosis 6-10 (1968). In 1977, Dr. Martin Orne wrote that
hypnosis was the "state... in which subjects are able to respond to appropriate sugges-
tions with distortions of perception of memory." See Orne, The Construct of Hypnosis:
Implications of the Definition for Research and Practice, 296 ANNALS N.Y. AcAD. SCL 14,
19 (1977).
Currently, three theories of hypnosis prevail. Note, supra, at 1207-08. The "state view"
describes hypnosis "ds a distinct state of consciousness, similar to sleep in that it involves a
partial inhibition of brain activity... [with] specific neural and physiological changes." Id.
at 1207. Dr. Orne criticizes this view, however, on the basis that there is no proof that the
physiological changes are uniquely associated with hypnosis. Orne, supra, at 19. The second
theory explains hypnosis in terms of behavior and stimuli. See Barber & Calverley, The
Relative Effectiveness of Task-Motivating Instructions and Trance-Induction Procedure in
the Production of "Hypnotic-Like" Behaviors, 137 J. NERvous & MErAL DISEASE 107, 107
(1963). The third theory uses Freudian concepts to explain hypnosis. Note, supra, at 1208.
11 Spiegel, Hypnosis: An Adjunct to Psychotherapy, in 2 COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF
PsYcumTRY § 30.4, at 1844 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as TEXTBOOK].
12 See Spiegel, supra note 5, at 73. The hypnotist does not project the hypnotic spell
onto the subject, but, rather, instigates the natural trance capacity inherent in the subject.
Id. Trance capacity differs among individuals and can be measured. Id. Hypnotic trances
can occur spontaneously as well as be self-induced. See H. SPIEGEL & D. SPIEGEL, supra note
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can be disciplined and directed toward specific therapeutic
goals. 1 3 The patient's disassociated attention is constantly sensi-
tive and responsive to cues from the hypnotist, thus permitting the
patient to concentrate intensely on areas or conditions, the clarifi-
cation of which can lead toward the designated goals.14 Succinctly
stated, hypnosis is a subjective state of mind in which a person is
more prone to accept "acceptable" suggestion.15
The first reference to hypnosis as being anything more than
pure quackery was in the 18th century. During that time, Franz
Anton Mesmer and his disciple, the Marquis de Puys~guar, prac-
ticed the art of "animal magnetism."' 6 In the centuries that fol-
lowed, hypnosis was the subject of much greater scientific scrutiny.
Among those who studied hypnosis in the 19th century were Braid,
Liebolt, Beheim, Janet and Freud.17 It was not until after World
War II, however, that American interest in hypnosis truly came to
fruition. Viewed as a quick and effective means to deal with World
War II combat neuroses, hypnotic techniques were used on a large
scale.18 Shortly thereafter, the medical professions began to accept
hypnosis as a therapeutic technique. During the 1950's, for in-
stance, the British and American Medical Associations formally
approved the use of hypnosis. 9 In 1960, hypnosis became a recog-
nized branch of psychology in America.20 Presently, even those
who oppose the admissibility of posthypnotic testimony concede
the current recognition of hypnosis by the scientific and therapeu-
tic communities.2
The jurisprudential background of hypnosis has proceeded
along similar lines. The earliest American case dealing with hyp-
notically induced evidence is the 1897 case of People v. Ebanks,22
in which the California Supreme Court refused to admit the testi-
6, at 34. See generally F.J. MONAGHAN, HYPNOSIS IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 3 (1980). For-
mal hypnosis differs from spontaneous trances in that the subject of formal hypnosis main-
tains "a sensitive, attentive responsiveness to an operator during the trance state." H. SpiE-
GEL & D. SPIEGEL, supra note 6, at 34.
, TE TBOOK, supra note 11, at 1844.
14 Spiegel, supra note 5, at 75.
E. BLOCK, supra note 1, at 11.
" Diamond, supra note 7, at 318.
17 E. BLOCK, supra note 1, at 9-21.
1, Diamond, supra note 7, at 320.
10 Note, supra note 10, at 1206 n.22.
20 Id. See generally Diamond, supra note 7, at 320-21.
21 See Diamond, supra note 7, at 321.
117 Cal. 652, 49 P. 1049 (1897).
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mony of an alleged expert who had hypnotized the defendant, in-
terrogated him, and adjudged him not guilty of murder.2" The
Ebanks court quite accurately stated that "[t]he law of the United
States does not recognize hypnotism." '24
In the years that followed, there was a definite paucity of cases
dealing with hypnotism. Indeed, between 1915 and 1950, there is
only one reported case concerning hypnosis' medico-legal aspects. 5
In that case, an Alabama appellate court held that evidence of the
defendant procuring property by hypnotizing his victim was insuf-
ficient to prove the requisite elements of robbery.2" The 1950's,
however, marked the advent of continual judicial consideration of
the subject. During that decade, the Supreme Court of North Da-
kota held that exculpatory statements made by a defendant while
under hypnosis were not admissible into evidence. In addition,
the California Supreme Court decided Cornell v. Superior Court,2s
the first case to rule favorably with respect to hypnotizing prospec-
tive witnesses. In Cornell, an attorney petitioned the California
Supreme Court to compel the superior court to allow his client to
employ a skilled lay hypnotist in order to prepare an adequate de-
fense against a murder charge.2 9 While declining to pass judgment
23 Id. at 665, 49 P. at 1053. In Ebanks, the defendant, at his murder trial, attempted to
introduce the testimony of an expert hypnotist who had hypnotized him, and had adjudged
him not guilty based upon exculpatory hypnotic statements. Id. The trial court sustained an
objection to this testimony. Id.
24 Id.
25 See Louis v. State, 24 Ala. App. 120, 130 So. 904 (Ct. App. 1930).
21 Id. at 121, 130 So. at 905.
31 State v. Pusch, 77 N.D. 860, 46 N.W.2d 508 (1950). In Puasch, the defendant and his
lover allegedly caused the death of the defendant's wife by administering a lethal dose of
strychnine. Id. at 866-67, 46 N.W.2d at 510-11. At trial, the defendant offered to prove that
Dr. Burgess, allegedly an expert hypnotist, placed the defendant in a hypnotic trance on
four occasions and questioned him extensively on all phases of the incident. Id. at 886-87, 46
N.W.2d at 521. The defendant offered the court the opportunity to question the expert and
offered to produce tape recordings of Dr. Burgess' examination of him. Id. at 887, 46
N.W.2d at 521. The defendant further offered to show that the hypnotic tests proved his
innocence. Id. at 887, 46 N.W.2d at 522. The lower court sustained objections to the offer of
proof and rejected the testimony. Id. at 887-88, 46 N.W.2d at 522. On appeal, the North
Dakota Supreme Court upheld the lower court's determination, stating that "[n]o case has
been cited. . . relating to the admissibility of the evidence proferred and no case has been
found." Id. at 888, 46 N.W.2d at 522.
- 52 Cal. 2d 99, 338 P.2d 447 (1959).
29 Id. at 100, 338 P.2d at 448. The defendant, Conrey, charged with murder, could not
remember his whereabouts and activities at the time of the murder due to "'intoxication,
shock, or otherwise."' Id. at 101, 338 P.2d at 448. The defendant's attorney, Cornell, was
able to ascertain "only that Conrey was wandering from bar to bar in an intoxicated condi-
tion during the time the alleged crime was committed .... "Id. Cornell sought to have
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on the admissibility of evidence secured through hypnosis," the
court declared that a defendant's right to counsel includes the
right to be hypnotized for the purpose of calling forth facts which
the defendant is unable to recall because of retrograde amnesia.31
Recent decades have seen a marked increase in the use of the
hypnotic device by law enforcement personnel.$2 Its popularity as
an investigatory tool has burgeoned since the 1976 Chowchilla kid-
napping." There, the driver of a busload of children recalled a li-
cense plate number while under hypnosis, which, with the excep-
tion of one digit, matched the license plate number of the van
driven by the kidnappers.3 4 The upshot of this expanded employ-
ment of hypnosis is a spate of cases dealing with the admissibility
of posthypnotic testimony.
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF POSTHYPNOTIC TESTIMONY: A MATTER OF
COMPETENCY OR CREDIBILITY?
An examination of the cases concerning whether hypnotically
induced or enhanced testimony is admissible reveals that American
jurisdictions have resolved the issue in three different ways. The
first category of cases excludes all testimony hypnotically in-
duced.3 5 The second approach is to admit posthypnotic testimony
Conrey recall the night in question through the use of hypnosis. Id. The sheriff refused to
allow this and the trial court denied Cornell's motion for an order directing the sheriff to
grant the request. Id.
80 Id. at 102, 338 P.2d at 449. The respondent argued that since a hypnotic examination
is not admissible at trial, such an examination would be of no assistance to the petitioner.
Id. at 101-02, 338 P.2d at 448. The respondent cited a number of cases including People v.
Ebanks, 117 Cal. 652, 49 P. 1049 (1897), see supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text, to
support the proposition that such an examination would not be admissible into evidence. 52
Cal. 2d at 102, 338 P.2d at 449. The California Supreme Court dismissed the respondent's
contentions because the cited cases addressed admissibility and not whether Conrey had a
right to be hypnotized in order to assist in the preparation of his defense. Id.
S Id. at 103, 338 P.2d at 449-50. The Cornell court stated that the constitutional right
to representation by counsel mandates that counsel be afforded reasonable opportunity to
prepare for trial. Id. at 103, 338 P.2d at 449. The court noted that hypnotism is recognized
as a means to help those with retrograde amnesia. Id. Accordingly, the court concluded that
Conrey had a constitutional right to be hypnotized since such hypnotism may result in
memories that, if corroborated, could prove his innocence. Id.
82 See supra note 7.
3' See F.J. MONAGHAN, supra note 12, at 9 (1980). The Chowchilla kidnapping occurred
in California in July 1976. Id. at 8. In that case, a busload of children had been kidnapped
by three masked men carrying pistols. Id. The victims were forced into a trailer buried 6
feet underground. Id.
4 Id.
31 E.g., State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 772 (Minn. 1980); see infra notes 38-73 and
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for all purposes on the premise that hypnosis affects the credibility
of a witness rather than his competence to testify.36 Finally, some
jurisdictions allow posthypnotic testimony provided that specific
procedural safeguards are followed."
Per Se Exclusion and the Frye Standard of Admissibility
Among the jurisdictions that apply a per se rule excluding
posthypnotic testimony are Minnesota,38 Arizona,3 9 California, 0
Maryland 4 and Michigan.4 2 These jurisdictions ground their de-
nial of admissibility on hypnosis' failure to meet the Frye standard
of "general acceptance" in the scientific community. 43
The case of State v. Mack44 is indicative of this approach. In
that case, hypnosis was used to refresh the complainant's memory
of events that took place when she suffered a serious injury while
heavily intoxicated.45 Once under hypnosis, the complainant
remembered the circumstances surrounding an assault that caused
her the injury.48 After recalling these events, the complainant was
given a posthypnotic suggestion that she would remember all of
the details.47 Following the hypnotic session, the complainant gave
a statement to the police describing the events that she had
"remembered" while under hypnosis, asserting that the statement
represented her present memory of the assault.48
accompanying text.
*1 E.g., State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 119, 244 S.E.2d 414, 427 (1978); see infra notes
75-87 and accompanying text.
11 E.g., State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 545-46, 432 A.2d 86, 90-91 (1981); see infra notes 88-
119 and accompanying text.
11 See State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 765 (Minn. 1980).
39 See State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 232, 624 P.2d 1274, 1279-80 (1981); State v. La
Mountain, 125 Ariz. 547, 551, 611 P.2d 551, 555 (1980).
,0 See People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 54, 641 P.2d 775, 796, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 265,
cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3220 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1982) (No. 82-78).
41 See Polk v. State, 48 Md. App. 382, 394-96, 427 A.2d 1041, 1048-49 (Ct. Spec. App.
1981).
42 See People v. Tait, 99 Mich. App. 19, 28, 297 N.W.2d 853, 857 (Ct. App. 1980).
E.g., State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Minn. 1980); see supra notes 2-3 and ac-
companying text.
" 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980).
45 Id. at 766-67.
" Id. at 767.
47 Id. The hypnotist gave the complainant a posthypnotic suggestion, stating, "[Y]ou
. . . will be able to remember very clearly everything that has happened on the 13th and
14th. Now that memory is very clear in your mind." Id.
48 Id.
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Before conducting a probable cause hearing, the trial court
certified to the Minnesota Supreme Court the question of whether
a previously hypnotized witness may testify at a criminal proceed-
ing concerning events recalled during a pretrial hypnotic session.,9
The Mack court viewed the admissibility issue as concerning the
reliability of hypnosis in reviving an accurate memory.50 Thus, the
court questioned the competency of the witness, as distinguished
from the credibility of the testimony."1 The standard applied was
the Frye requirement that a consensus within the scientific com-
munity concerning the reliability of a scientific device must be pre-
sent before the device or its results will be admissible.52
49 Id.
60 Id. at 768. The Mack court recognized that a person under hypnosis "is highly sus-
ceptible to suggestion, even that which is subtle and unintended." Id. Given this susceptibil-
ity, the Mack court believed that the possibility of suggestion creates too great a threat of
fabrication to admit into evidence the testimony of a person who previously has been hyp-
notized. Id. This suggestion, the court noted, may be made prior to or during the hypnotic
session. Id. Prior to the hypnotic session, persons interested in the investigation may have
expressed to the subject their views on what happened during the incident. Id. The subject,
"influenced by a need to 'fill gaps,"' may incorporate this speculation into his or her mem-
ory of the events. Id. This "gap-filling" is analogous to a situation where a witness in an
investigation repeatedly tells his story. Frequently, the detail of witness description in-
creases the more a witness discusses an incident. See Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You?
Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29
STA. L. REv. 969, 983-84 (1977). These incorporations may cause permanent memory dis-
tortion, making it impossible to determine later the veracity of the subject's statements.
Note, supra note 10, at 1221. The subject may be influenced further by his or her "desire to
please either the hypnotist or others ... who have urged that it is important that he or she
remember certain events." 292 N.W.2d at 768.
The Mack court also noted the threat that facts, of which the subject previously was
unsure, will become "hardened" in his memory following the hypnotic session. Id. at 769.
Once hypnotized, observed the court, the subject will be so convinced of the veracity of his
story that he could pass a lie detector test uttering statements that are in fact false. Id. This
self-confidence in the truthfulness of the story could lead to the unintentional deception of a
jury. Id.
Finally, recognizing potential difficulties in cross-examining such a witness, the Mack
court concluded that it would be impossible to determine "which parts [of the memory]...
are historically accurate, which are entirely fanciful, and which are lies." Id. This is signifi-
cant since a popular misconception, likely to be subscribed to by a jury, is that a person
under hypnosis always tells the truth. See id. at 769; Note, supra note 10, at 1209.
51 292 N.W.2d at 769-70.
52 Id. at 768. Since it was impossible scientifically to verify truth from fiction through
the use of hypnosis, such testimony did not meet the Frye standard. Id. Indeed, the court
illustrated the potential for fabrication by indicating the fallacies in the complainant's post-
hypnotic testimony. Id. at 772. Following the hypnotic session, the complainant asserted
that she had been stabbed repeatedly, that the defendant's motorcycle was a black Yamaha,
and that on the day of the alleged assault she had pizza with her father at a particular
restaurant. Id. Hospital records indicated, however, that the complainant was stabbed once.
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Similarly, in State v. Mena,5" the Arizona Supreme Court
promulgated a blanket rule against the admission of testimony
that had been refreshed by hypnosis.54 In Mena, the victim of an
attack was taken by a police officer to see two doctors who hypno-
tized him in order to improve his recall of the surrounding de-
tails.55 The doctors suggested that he would remember his re-
sponses after he came out of hypnosis.5 At trial, the victim was
permitted to testify, notwithstanding the defendant's objection
that the hypnotist did not testify that the victim's memory was
refreshed independently of any suggestion by the hypnotist.5 The
issue on appeal was whether testimony that was possibly tainted
by hypnosis should have been excluded upon timely objection.58
The Mena court held that if the prosecution attempts to enhance
the witness' memory by having him questioned while under hypno-
sis, it will lose the opportunity to use the witness' testimony at
trial." A review of the literature in the area convinced the court
that hypnosis was not yet accepted in the scientific community as
Id. Furthermore, the defendant's motorcycle was not a black Yamaha, but a maroon Tri-
umph. Id. Finally, the restaurant named by the complainant did not serve pizza. Id. These
circumstances, in conjunction with the inherent uncertainties involved with the use of hyp-
notism to refresh memory, convinced the Mack court of the unreliability of posthypnotic
testimony and the need to declare all such testimony inadmissible under the Frye rule. See
id. at 769-72.
The Mack decision represents an expansion of the Frye decision's application to scien-
tific devices. Prior to Mack, the Frye rule had been used to determine the admissibility of
evidence derived from mechanical scientific devices, such as polygraphs, voiceprints, gun-
shot residue tests, neutron activation analysis, sodium pentothal, bitemark comparisons, and
scanning electron microscopic analysis. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evi-
dence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1205-06
(1980). The Mack court extended Frye's application to a nonmechanical device that involves
the restoring of memory for the purpose of witness testimony. See Case Note, Hypnotically-
Induced Testimony Held Inadmissible in Criminal Proceeding, 7 WM. MrrcHEL L. REV.
264, 277 (1981).
13 128 Ariz. 226, 624 P.2d 1274 (1980).
Id. at 232, 624 P.2d at 1280.




89 Id. at 231-32, 624 P.2d at 1279-80. The Mena court stated that "[t]he determination
of the guilt or innocence of an accused should not depend on the unknown consequences of
a procedure concededly used for the purpose of changing in some way a witness' memory."
Id. at 231, 624 P.2d at 1279. The Mena court justified its decision by referring to the exclu-
sionary rule enunciated in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), which proscribes the
admission of testimony at trial which is the product of "an illegal pre-trial identification
procedure." 128 Ariz. at 232, 624 P.2d at 1280; see 388 U.S. at 241.
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a reliable means of refreshing memory. 0 The dangers cited by the
Mena court included the suggestibility of a person in a hypnotic
trance, and his subsequent inability to distinguish between his own
memories and pseudomemories implanted during hypnosis."'
In accord with the foregoing are People v. Shirley"2 and Peo-
ple v. Tait.6 3 Applying the Frye test, courts in California and
Michigan determined that hypnosis has not gained general accept-
ance in the field to which it belongs, at least as a means of ob-
taining accurate recall of prior events." In addition, the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court entertained serious doubts as to the
reliability of hypnotically refreshed testimony, and concluded that
these doubts justified the exclusion of such evidence.6 5 The court
emphasized, however, that its holding did not establish a per se
60 128 Ariz. at 228-31, 624 P.2d at 1276-79; accord State ex rel. Collins v. Superior
Court, 644 P.2d 1266, 1272 (Ariz. 1982) (en banc) (supplemental opinion); State v. La
Mountain, 125 Ariz. 547, 551, 611 P.2d 551, 555 (1980).
41 128 Ariz. at 229-30, 624 P.2d at 1277-78. The Mena court indicated that a person
under hypnosis is open to any suggestions "deliberately or unwittingly communicated by the
hypnotist." Id. at 229, 624 P.2d at 1277 (quoting Diamond, supra note 7, at 314). The court
cautioned further that a subject under hypnosis, motivated by a desire to please the hypno-
tist, may fabricate events and later believe that these "memories" are the product of per-
sonal experience. 128 Ariz. at 228-29, 624 P.2d at 1276-77. See generally Dilloff, The Admis-
sibility of Hypnotically Influenced Testimony, 4 Omo N.U.L. Rav. 1, 4-9 (1977).
42 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3220 (U.S.
Oct. 5, 1982) (No. 82-78); see infra note 72.
63 99 Mich. App. 19, 297 N.W.2d 853 (Ct. App. 1980). In Tait, the defendant allegedly
threatened a deputy sheriff with a gun. Id. at 21, 297 N.W.2d at 854. Prior to trial, the
sheriff was hypnotized by the prosecuting attorney, an amateur hypnotist, in order to re-
fresh the sheriff's memory. Id. at 25, 297 N.W.2d at 855. The defendant was given no notice
of this until the sheriff testified at trial. Id. The trial judge denied the defendant's motion
for a mistrial, and did not allow the fact of the hypnotic session to be disclosed to the jury.
Id. at 25, 297 N.W.2d at 855-56. On appeal, the Tait court reversed, holding that hypnosis
had not yet been scientifically accepted, and, therefore, testimony obtained through hypno-
sis was inadmissible. Id. at 28, 297 N.W.2d at 857. Irrespective of the reliability issue, the
court held that the deputy's testimony was inadmissable as a result of the prosecution's
failure to give the defendant notice of the pretrial hypnosis. Id. at 29, 297 N.W.2d at 857 (by
implication).
See Polk v. State, 48 Md. App. at 394, 427 A.2d at 1046-48; People v. Tait, 99 Mich.
App. at 28, 297 N.W.2d at 857.
61 See Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 436 A.2d 170, 174-78 (Pa. 1981). The court cited
various experts and examined the problems involved with hypnotized subjects' "hypersug-
gestibility and hypercompliance." Id. at 174. The court determined that since the subject is
often anxious to please the hypnotist, he "will unconsciously create answers to the questions
which the hypnotist asks if he cannot recount the details being sought." Id. Following hyp-
nosis, the court observed, the subject possesses a firm "confidence and conviction" as to the
truth of his statements, id., and thus it would be impossible to determine with certitude the
veracity of the testimony, id. at 174-75. The court, therefore, declined to sanction the ad-
mission of the testimony. Id. at 176-78.
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rule against the admissibility of such testimony.6 Hypnotically re-
freshed memory may be admitted, the court stated, when it is
presented with more conclusive proof that the procedures for ob-
taining it meet the Frye standard. 7
Closely linked to the Frye analysis are the scientific arguments
in favor of a blanket exclusionary rule. These objections were
presented by Dr. Bernard Diamond, who argued that hypnosis ir-
reversibly alters a witness' memory, thus rendering hypnotically
influenced testimony unreliable."8 Dr. Diamond claims that a pre-
viously hypnotized witness is incompetent to testify because: (1) he
will fantasize, or confabulate while hypnotized;6 9 (2) he will con-
fuse his hypnotic memory of events with his pre- and posthypnotic
waking memories, and, after hypnosis, not be able to separate his
fabrications from true recall;7 0 and (3) he will, after hypnosis, sub-
jectively be certain of the accuracy and truth of his hypnotic mem-
ory, whereas before hypnosis he was willing to express some
uncertainty.7 1
Although a number of jurisdictions have adopted the blanket
66 Id. at 178. The witness in Nazarovitch was under the influence of a hallucinogen at
the time of the crime. This, in the court's view, presented a poor set of facts upon which to
premise a blanket exclusionary rule. See id. at 177-78.
6" Id. at 178.
" Diamond, supra note 7, at 314 ("once a potential witness has been hypnotized for the
purpose of enhancing memory his recollections have been so contaminated that he is ren-
dered effectively incompetent to testify").
"' Id. at 333-41. Dr. Diamond believes that human beings have great difficulty in separ-
ating thoughts which are "the product of their own volition" from those that possibly were
suggested by other sources, whether those suggestions were intentional* or not. Id. at 333-34.
Often, memories recited by a witness after hypnosis will be real memories, but they may be
recollections of events distinct from the incident in question. Id. at 335. Indeed, Dr. Dia-
mond suggests that "[a] subject who has lost the memory of the source of his learned infor-
mation will assume that the memory is spontaneous to his own experience." Id. at 336.
7' Id. at 335-36. Dr. Diamond comments that, by virtue of a hypnotized subject's ten-
dency to "fill in gaps" with fantasy or confabulation, hypnotically refreshed memory may
consist of: "(1) appropriate actual events, (2) entirely irrelevant actual events, (3) pure fan-
tasy, and (4) fantasized details supplied to make a logical whole." Id. at 335. Pretrial hypno-
sis therefore materially influences a witness' testimony "in ways that are outside the con-
sciousness of the witness and difficult, if not impossible, to detect." Id. at 336. Moreover,
these confabulations frequently are well detailed, coherent and consistent with corroborat-
ing evidence. Id. at 337-38.
7'1 Id. at 339-42. In contrast to prehypnotic hesitancy, a witness who has been hypno-
tized may be "significantly" more confident in the veracity of his recollections. Id. at 339.
"Thus, a witness who quite honestly reveals that he is unsure of the identification of a
defendant from a photograph or a line-up, may, after hypnosis, become quite certain and
confident that he has picked the right man." Id. at 339-40.
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exclusion position put forth by Dr. Diamond, 2 it has been rejected
in civil decisions of the federal courts, 3 and, more recently, in
criminal cases in several states where such evidence has either
been admitted for all purposes or only when certain procedural
safeguards have been met. 4
Admissible for All Purposes-A Question of Credibility
Courts embracing the second approach have admitted hypnot-
ically influenced evidence on the theory.that the prior hypnosis of
a witness is merely one of the factors that a jury must weigh in
assessing the credibility of a witness.7 5 One of the earliest reported
decisions permitting the use of hypnotically induced evidence for
72 E.g., People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 66-67, 641 P.2d 775, 804, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243,
272-73, cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3220, (U.S. Oct. 5, 1982) (No. 82-78). The California Su-
preme Court, in Shirley, discussed the problems inherent in hypnosis, including the possible
suggestibility of the subject, the subject's tendency to confabulate or create pseudomemo-
ries, the inability of the subject and the examiner to recognize such confabulation, and the
subject's imperviousness to cross-examination. Id. at 63-66, 641 P.2d at 802-04, 181 Cal.
Rptr. at 270-72. In addition, the Shirley court touched upon a topic not treated extensively
in previous cases: the model of human memory espoused by the proponents of hypnotically
refreshed recall. See id. at 57-62, 641 P.2d at 798-801, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 266-70. This model,
the court noted, analogizes human memory to a videotape machine, "faithfully record[ing],
as if on film, every perception experienced by the witness, . . . permanently stor[ing] such
recorded perceptions in the brain at a subconscious level, and ... accurately 'replay[ing]'
them in their original form when the witness is placed under hypnosis and asked to remem-
ber them." Id. at 56, 641 P.2d at 798, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 266. The Shirley court further
observed, however, that the established view among medical professionals is that rather
than functioning like a videotape recorder, human memory undergoes continuous alteration
due to various influences. Id. Hence, the court concluded that the scientific community per-
ceives memory as productive rather than reproductive, and, thus, when memories are re-
trieved, the accuracy of these recollections may be compromised by external influences. Id.
at 57-63, 641 P.2d at 798-801, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 266-70. See generally D. HINTZMAN, THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING AND MEMORY 297-311 (1978) (critique of experiments tending to
prove the videotape memory model).
73 See, e.g., Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 1975) (per
curiam); Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506, 509 (9th Cir. 1974). In Kline, the
plaintiff sued an automobile manufacturer in strict liability. 523 F.2d at 1068. The trial
court's exclusion of the plaintiff's testimony on the grounds that her memory had been re-
freshed by pretrial hypnosis was held to be reversible error. Id. at 1069. The fact that the
plaintiff was hypnotized did not affect admissibility, but rather "credibility and the weight
to be given such testimony [which] were [issues] for the jury to determine." Id. at 1070.
(quoting Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506, 509 (9th Cir. 1974)).
In Wyller, a helicopter passenger who survived a crash sued the manufacturer of the
aircraft. 503 F.2d at 507-08. Prior to trial, the survivor was hypnotized to refresh his mem-
ory of the events preceding the crash. Id. at 509. The court of appeals held that the hypno-
sis merely affected the credibility of the witness. Id.
74 See infra notes 75-119 and accompanying text.
71 See infra notes 85-87.
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all purposes is Harding v. State.7 In Harding, a rape victim
remembered the details of an assault following hypnosis.7 Two po-
lice officers were present at the audiotaped hypnotic session,
though they did not participate.78 In allowing the victim's testi-
mony, the court emphasized the hypnotist's professional exper-
tise 7  and the solid foundation that was laid for the testimony. 0
71 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (Ct. Spec. App. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949
(1969). In Harding, the victim, Mildred Coley, met the defendant, James Milton Harding, in
a bar in Baltimore City. Id. at 232, 246 A.2d at 304. They joined another couple, Barbara
Miles and Robert Lee Sanders. Id. The two couples drank and drove around the city in
Sander's car until Harding, angered that Mildred would not sit with him in the back seat
and engage in sexual relations with him, shot Mildred. Id. Harding then ordered Sanders to
drive to a back road in an isolated area of Howard County. Id. After dropping off the body,
and after meeting Harding's brother at another bar, Sanders drove Harding home. Id. As
the defendant was leaving Harding's home, he saw Harding get into his brother's station
wagon. Id. The following day Mildred was found lying 4 or 5 feet off a road in Howard
County that was 2 or 3 miles from the location at which she was originally placed. Id. at 232,
246 A.2d at 304. An examination disclosed traces of sperm in her vagina. Id.
7 Id. When the victim initially was questioned in a hospital emergency room as to the
events of the night she was shot, she said that she had been abducted from Baltimore City
at knifepoint by three males. Id. at 233, 246 A.2d at 304. Upon being questioned for the
second and third times, she recanted her story, and recalled everything up until the point
when she was removed from the car. Id. at 233-34, 246 A.2d at 304-05. In addition, she
positively identified a photograph of Sanders. Id. at 233, 246 A.2d at 305. The victim later
was put under hypnosis by a trained psychologist, id., after which she identified Harding as
the person who shot her, id. at 235, 246 A.2d at 305. She also remembered the following
events: a truck or station wagon approached her as she was lying on the side of the road;
Harding placed her in the vehicle; the car arrived at another location; Harding threw her on
the ground, and unzippered her dress; and, after regaining consciousness, she noticed that
her undergarments had been removed. Id.
The posthypnotic improvement of a witness' memory is not a unique phenomenon.
"Clinical reports from several practitioners who have assisted the police in criminal investi-
gations have described dramatic improvements in the memories of witnesses and victims of
crime who are placed under hypnosis." Note, supra note 10, at 1210-11 (citation omitted).
78 5 Md. App. at 242-43, 246 A.2d at 309.
7' Id. at 235, 246 A.2d at 306. The hypnotist possessed a master's degree in psychology
and had pursued work on his doctorate. Id. At the time of the hypnosis, he was Chief
Clinical Psychologist at Clifton J. Perkins State Hospital, and formerly was employed as a
staff psychologist at Crownsville State Hospital. Id. at 236, 246 A.2d at 306. He was quali-
fied to testify as an expert in psychology in Baltimore City and several counties in Mary-
land. Id. Prior to hypnotizing the victim, he had practiced the technique of hypnosis for 4
years. Id.
80 See id. at 247, 246 A.2d at 312. It has been suggested that the party introducing the
posthypnotic testimony has the burden of proving that the hypnosis session was conducted
properly. Note, supra note 10, at 1228. Additionally, some commentators recommend that
the hypnotist testify prior to the previously hypnotized witness in order to lay a foundation
for the witness' testimony. Spector & Foster, Admissibility of Hypnotic Statements: Is the
Law of Evidence Susceptible?, 38 OHIO STATE L.J. 567, 593 (1977). It is felt that such testi-
mony on the part of the hypnotist will ensure that hypnotic procedures will be conducted
without suggestion or implantation. Putnam, supra note 9, at 444-46. But see Diamond,
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The Harding court stated that "modern medical science has now
recognized the possibility that memory of painful events can some-
times be restored by hypnosis, although some authorities warn that
fancy can be mingled with fact in some cases." 81 The court also
pointed out that the testimony was corroborated substantially by
other evidence.82 Additionally, the trial judge recognized the need
for a precautionary instruction concerning the weight to be given
the evidence. 3
Although Maryland later seemed to repudiate this view in
State v. Polk,s4 subsequent cases dealing with hypnotically in-
supra note 7, at 333.
"1 5 Md. App. at 246, 246 A.2d at 311-12; see People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill. App. 3d 379,
385-86, 385 N.E.2d 848, 853 (App. Ct. 1979) (hypnosis is a valuable tool that can be used to
restore memory). Some commentators have posited that "[a] witness whose memory has
been refreshed through hypnosis may be able to recount an observed event more fully and
accurately than any other witness." Spector & Foster, supra note 80, at 590. But see Note,
Hypnotism, Suggestibility and the Law, 31 NFB. L. REv. 575, 583 (1952).
82 5 Md. App. at 247, 246 A.2d at 312. The witness' testimony was corroborated by
evidence that sperm was found in the victim's vagina, that the accused and Sanders were
the only two males who knew the victim's location when the crime was committed, and that
Harding was seen in a station wagon immediately before the crime was committed. Id. Addi-
tionally, the court, observing that the witness considered her testimony as deriving from her
own recollection, stated: "The fact that she had told different stories or had achieved her
present knowledge after being hypnotized concerns the question of the weight of the evi-
dence which the trier of facts ... must decide." Id. at 236, 246 A.2d at 306.
83 Id. at 244, 246 A.2d at 310. The trial judge instructed the jury:
You have heard, during this trial, that a portion of the testimony of the prosecut-
ing witness ... was recalled by her as a result of her being placed under hypnosis.
The phenomenon commonly known as hypnosis has been explained to you during
this trial. I advise you to weigh this testimony carefully. Do not place any greater
weight on this portion of [the] testimony than on any other testimony that you
have heard during this trial. Remember, you are the judges of the weight and the
believability of all of the evidence in this case.
Id. For a discussion of cases that have used similar precautionary instructions, see infra
note 85.
84 48 Md. App. 382, 391, 427 A.2d 1041, 1046-47 (Ct. Spec. App. 1981). The defendant
in Polk was convicted of committing various sexual offenses against an 8-year-old boy. Id. at
383-84, 427 A.2d at 1043. The boy, unable to recall the incident, was hypnotized by a state
trooper 5 months after the incident. Id. at 385, 427 A.2d at 1043. The trooper's hypnotic
training consisted of a 2-day seminar and the reading of three books on the subject. Id. The
defendant objected to the use of the boy's testimony, asserting that hypnosis was not a
proven science, that the hypnotist was unqualified, that his questions were suggestive, and
that the gap between the date of the incident and that of the hypnotic session was imper-
missibly long. Id. at 387, 427 A.2d at 1044-45. The defendant's objections were overruled,
and he appealed to the court of special appeals. Id. at 387-88, 427 A.2d at 1045.
The court of special appeals observed that subsequent to the Harding decision, the
Frye rule was adopted in Maryland in Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978), and
remanded the case for a determination of the scientific acceptance of hypnosis. 48 Md. App.
at 394, 427 A.2d at 1048. A mere finding that hypnosis is scientifically acceptable, the court
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:30
duced testimony have applied the Harding rule that pretrial hyp-
nosis raises questions not of competency, but of credibility and
weight.5 Generally, these cases have reasoned that the use of hyp-
nosis to revive a witness' memory should be treated like any other
present recollection refreshed."6 Additionally, these courts assume
that skillful cross-examination will enable a jury to evaluate the
effect of hypnosis on the credibility of the testimony.8
7
indicated, is not dispositive of the admissibility question. Id. at 395, 427 A.2d at 1049. Cer-
tain questions concerning the hypnotist's qualifications, his objectivity and technique (as
they bear on the possibility of suggestion), and whether any posthypnotic suggestions were
given must first be answered. Id. As an additional safeguard, the court suggested that when
hypnotically refreshed testimony is offered in court, the fact that the witness was hypno-
tized must be revealed to the factfinder. Id. at 396, 427 A.2d at 1049.
85 E.g., Clark v. State, 379 So. 2d 372, 376 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); People v. Smrekar,
68 11. App. 3d 379, 386, 385 N.E.2d 848, 853 (Ct. App. 1979). Although a number of courts
consider the admissibility of posthypnotic testimony a matter of witness competency, e.g.,
State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 769 (Minn. 1980), other courts regard pretestimony hypno-
sis as affecting credibility, United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667, 669 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979); United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 198 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1006 (1978); United States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252, 283-84 (E.D. Mich. 1977);
State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 119-21, 244 S.E.2d 414, 427 (1978); State v. Jorgensen, 8 Or.
App. 1, 8, 492 P.2d 312, 315 (Ct. App. 1971).
In Narciso, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan recog-
nized that hypnosis may have no impact upon the witness' testimony; that it may enable the
witness to delve into his memory and remember things either forgotten or repressed; and
that it may affect the witness' mind to such an extent that he would fabricate a "memory
composed partly of real memories and partly of fantasy." 446 F. Supp. at 281. The court
chose to submit these alternatives to the jury, stating that "[o]n these facts where the
probabilities are closely in equipoise, the Court will not remove from the jury the function
of finding the facts." Id. at 281-82.
The McQueen case is somewhat unique in its resolution of the credibility issue. In Mc-
Queen, the Supreme Court of North Carolina analogized a hypnotized witness to one who
has undergone some psychiatric or other medical treatment which has improved his or her
memory. 295 N.C. at 122, 244 S.E.2d at 428. The court reasoned that since the credibility of
all medically induced testimony is a matter for the jury's consideration, the same principle
should obtain when a witness has been hypnotized. Id. In facts similar to those in McQueen,
the memory of the witness in Jorgensen was restored through psychiatric and drug treat-
ment as well as hypnosis. 8 Or. App. at 9, 492 P.2d at 315. The court admitted the testi-
mony simply by stating that the credibility of the witness was for the jury to decide. Id.
88 State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 119-21, 244 S.E.2d 414, 427-28 (1978); State v. Jor-
gensen, 8 Or. App. 1, 8, 492 P.2d 312, 315 (Ct. App. 1971).
87 See, e.g., Creamer v. State, 232 Ga. 136, 138, 205 S.E.2d 240, 242 (1974); State v.
Jorgensen, 8 Or. App. 1, 9, 492 P.2d 312, 315 (Ct. App. 1971). See generally Diamond, supra
note 7, at 321. The Creamer court justified the admission of posthypnotic testimony by
emphasizing, among other things, that both the hypnotist and the witness were cross-ex-
amined "extensively and thoroughly" by an experienced advocate. 232 Ga. at 138, 205
S.E.2d at 242. Similarly, in Jorgensen, the court justified admitting the testimony of two
hypnotized witnesses by emphasizing that both had been "subjected to prolonged and rigor-
ous cross-examination by defendant's counsel.. . . " 8 Or. App. at 8, 492 P.2d at 315.
The opportunity for sufficient and thorough cross-examination as a prerequisite to ad-
1982] POSTHYPNOTIC TESTIMONY
Admissibility in Light of Procedural Safeguards
Several courts have selected a middle road and have enumer-
ated procedures aimed at reducing the potential unreliability of
the statements produced. " Recently, in State v. Hurd,"9 the New
Jersey Supreme Court held that the testimony of a witness who
had undergone hypnosis to restore her memory was inadmissible in
a criminal trial unless strict procedural safeguards were observed
at the hypnotic session. 0 In Hurd, the victim of a stabbing showed
an unwillingness or inability to describe her attacker.91 The victim
was hypnotized in an attempt to enhance her recollection of the
incident.92 During the hypnotic session, which was performed by a
psychiatrist, "3 the victim identified her former spouse as the assail-
ant.94 At trial, the accused ex-husband challenged the admissibility
mitting hypnotically induced testimony enables the trier of fact to better evaluate the
weight and credibility to be accorded a witness' testimony. See Diamond, supra note 7, at
321. But see Spector & Foster, supra note 80, at 593 (subject's conviction of the truth of his
testimony renders cross-examination "virtually ineffective").
"' See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 198-99, 199 n.12 (9th Cir. 1978) (care
must be taken to ensure that the subject's testimony is not tainted by suggestions received
during the hypnotic session); People v. Smrekar, 68 I. App. 3d 379, 388, 385 N.E.2d 848,
855 (App. Ct. 1979) (testimony admissible where hypnotist is competent, independent evi-
dence corroborates the subject's statements, and there is no evidence of suggestiveness);
Polk v. State, 48 Md. App. 382, 395, 427 A.2d 1041, 1049 (Ct. Spec. App. 1981) (hypnotist
must be qualified and disinterested and must avoid leading questions or other suggestible
techniques); see also Case Note, supra note 52, at 271 & n.30. But see State ex rel. Collins v.
Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 187, 644 P.2d 1266, 1272 (1982) (en banc) (supplemental
opinion) (safeguards cannot improve reliability of testimony).
"9 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981).
90 Id. at 545-49, 432 A.2d at 96-98; see infra notes 100-08 and accompanying text.
9- 86 N.J. at 529-30, 432 A.2d at 88. The prosecutor's office and the police department
identified two suspects, the victim's current husband, David Sell, who was in the apartment
when the attack occured, and the victim's former husband, Paul Hurd. Id. at 530, 432 A.2d
at 88. Mrs. Sell informed the police that they should "check out" her ex-husband. Id.
92 Id. at 530-31, 432 A.2d at 88-89. The entire hypnotic interview was tape-recorded. Id.
at 531, 432 A.2d at 88. Prior to the hypnosis, Mrs. Sell was questioned by the hypnotist
about the events surrounding the attack. Id. She indicated that she knew one of the sus-
pects' names, but she did not mention which one. Id. Additionally, she described a person
standing near the dresser in her bedroom and a person leaning in the window. Id.
"' Id. at 530, 432 A.2d at 88. In addition to the hypnotist, two officers from the prosecu-
tor's office and a medical student were present at the session. Id. The victim was instructed
to answer questions from the officers as well as from the hypnotist. Id. at 531, 432 A.2d at
88.
, Id., 432 A.2d at 89. Under hypnosis, Mrs. Sell described the facial features of her
attacker in response to questions by the hypnotist. Id. The victim's ex-husband was identi-
fied as the assailant in response to the detective's direct question, "Is it Paul?" Id. The
victim expressed doubt about her response when she was brought out of the hypnotic
trance. Id. The officers encouraged Mrs. Sell to accept her identification of her former hus-
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of the hypnotically refreshed testimony. 5
The Hurd court stated that "hypnosis, unless carefully con-
trolled, is not generally accepted as a reliable means of obtaining
accurate recall," and further noted that a person under hypnosis is
vulnerable to suggestion."' Such a person may be willing to specu-.
late and often loses the ability to distinguish memories evoked by
hypnosis from prior recollections. 7 The court found, however, that
a "rule of per se inadmissibility is unnecessarily broad .... "198
The court held, therefore, that such hypnotically enhanced testi-
mony should be admissible if a trial court finds that the use of
hypnosis was reasonably likely to elicit recollections comparable to
those that would result from normal memory.99
The Hurd court adopted an extensive set of procedural safe-
guards as a condition precedent to admitting hypnotically induced
recollections. 100 First, the hypnotist should be a licensed psychia-
band, and to make a formal identification of him as her attacker. Id. They explained to her
that by not identifying Paul Hurd she was in effect implicating her present husband and
was leaving herself and her children in possible danger. Id. Six days later, Mrs. Sell formally
identified Paul Hurd as her assailant. Id. at 532, 432 A.2d at 89.
"' Id. The defendant argued that. since hypnosis fails to satisfy the Frye standard for
the admissibility of scientific evidence, any testimony based on a prior hypnotic session
should be per se inadmissible. Id. Alternatively, the defendant argued that even if hypnoti-
cally induced testimony is not per se inadmissible, the procedure utilized in this case was
improper due to the coercive and suggestive nature of the questioning. Id.
" Id. at 539, 432 A.2d at 93.
9 Id. at 539-40, 432 A.2d at 93-94.
91 Id. at 541, 432 A.2d at 94.
9 Id. at 543, 432 A.2d at 95. The court discussed the shortcomings of any eyewitness
account of an event. Id. at 541, 432 A.2d at 94. Psychological studies have indicated that the
normal human memory is an active process, and often the subject unconsciously fills in the
gaps in memory so that the total picture will make sense. Id.; see, e.g., Levine & Tapp, The
Psychology of Criminal Identification: The Gap from Wade to Kirby, 121 U. PA. L. REv.
1079, 1082 (1973). Additionally, the most accurate method of recall, unprompted narrative,
ordinarily results in an incomplete picture. 86 N.J. at 541-42, 432 A.2d at 94. The system of
interrogating witnesses evolved from the needs created by the imperfect workings of the
normal memory, see id. at 542, 432 A.2d at 95, but interrogation often serves to distort the
witness' recollection because the pressure to answer in spite of gaps leads to less accurate
responses, id., 432 A.2d at 94. This phenomenon is increased when the subject is hypnotized.
See People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 63-64, 641 P.2d 775, 802-03, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 270-71
(1982) (en banc); infra note 141.
The solution proposed by the Hurd court is to require that in each case, the recollection
enhanced by hypnosis be approximately as reliable as normal human memory. 86 N.J. at
543, 432 A.2d at 95. Once a finding is made that the recollections under hypnosis are compa-
rably reliable to those resulting from normal memory processes, admissibility of evidence
tending to show the general unreliability of hypnosis would not be allowed. Id. The proce-
dures employed in a particular case, however, may be subject to challenge. Id.
110 See 86 N.J. at 545-46, 432 A.2d at 96-97; infra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
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trist or psychologist trained in the use of hypnosis. 10 1 Second, the
court emphasized the importance of the hypnotist's independence
from the parties involved in the case. 02 Third, all information
given to the hypnotist in advance of the hypnotic session must be
in writing. 03 Fourth, prior to the hypnotic session, the hypnotist
should obtain a detailed list of the remembered facts from the wit-
ness. 0 4 Fifth, the court mandated that the session be recorded,
and strongly recommended the use of videotape for this purpose. 05
In addition to the enumerated procedural safeguards, the Hurd court held that the party
seeking to introduce the hypnotically refreshed testimony must notify his opponent of this
intent and provide him with a recording of the session. 86 N.J. at 543, 432 A.2d at 95. At the
.admissibility hearing, the court first must determine the type of memory loss experienced
by the witness. This is necessary because, for example, the reliability of hypnotically re-
stored recall is greater when there is a pathological reason for the memory loss than when
the hypnosis is used simply to help a witness recall details. Id. at 544, 432 A.2d at 95-96.
Moreover, the court should determine whether a witness has a discernible motivation for
"remembering" a particular version of the events in question. Id., 432 A.2d at 96. If after
considering these factors the court concludes that the hypnotic recall is comparable to that
which would have been recalled under normal conditions, it must evaluate the procedures
followed. Id. In this connection, the court noted the manner of questioning as being particu-
larly important. Id. For example, simple narrative is the least prodding, and, therefore,
would weigh in favor of admitting the testimony. Id. The Hurd court also emphasized that
the purpose behind reviewing the procedures "is not to determine whether the proffered
testimony is accurate, but instead whether the use of hypnosis and the procedure followed
in the particular case was a reasonably reliable means of restoring the witness' memory." Id.
at 543, 432 A.2d at 95. See generally Orne, The Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in Court, 27
INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERiMENTAL HYPNOSIS 311, 325 (1979).
101 86 N.J. at 545, 432 A.2d at 96. The professional who conducts the hypnotic session
should qualify as an expert. Id. Thus, the court will be able to elicit the professional's aid in
discovering the pathological reason for the memory loss and the "hypnotizability" of the
witness. Id. Additionally, an expert should be able to obtain the most accurate results. Id.;
see M. REISER, HANDBOOK OF INvESTIGATIvE HYPNOSIS 32 (1980) (expert's status tends to
increase the subject's responsiveness).
102 86 N.J. at 545, 432 A.2d at 96. The expert should not be employed regularly by the
prosecution, police or defense. Id. This will preclude the possibility of bias on the part of
the hypnotist, both intentional and unintentional. Id.
103 Id. at 546, 432 A.2d at 96. The court believed that requiring a written enumeration
of all information given to the hypnotist prior to the session would enable the factfinder
later to determine what, if any, information was communicated to the subject during hypno-
sis. Id.
104 Id. Prior to hypnosis, the witness should describe the facts as he remembers them
without structured questions. See id. at 541-42, 432 A.2d at 94. This will enable the court to
determine whether a discrepancy exists, and, if so, whether the difference is due to sugges-
tion occurring during the hypnotic session. See United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 199
n.12 (9th Cir. 1978).
106 86 N.J. at 546, 432 A.2d at 97. In order to detect any cues that the hypnotist inad-
vertently may have given, and to ensure the availability and accuracy of any information
gleaned, a recording of every session is mandatory. Id. Since videotaping the sessions would
be the most useful procedure and the only way of detecting visual cues, its use is strongly
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Sixth, no one other than the hypnotist and the subject should be
present during any phase of the hypnotic process. 06 The Hurd
court determined that under the facts at hand, the procedural re-
quirements were not met'0 7 and that the suggestive procedures
used "raise[d] grave doubts about the reliability of the hypnoti-
cally refreshed testimony obtained, which render[ed] that testi-
mony inadmissible. '"10 8
A number of courts have employed a similar analysis. 0 9 In
People v. Lucas,"l the defendant moved to suppress the testimony
of a witness who had undergone hypnosis prior to trial.""' The
court held that the witness' testimony was admissible despite the
fact that many of the required procedures were not adhered to rig-
idly.1 2 The witness' pre- and posthypnotic statements were sub-
stantially similar," 3 however, and the defendant's own expert wit-
ness testified that the witness either had feigned hypnosis, or was
not in a suggestible state."4
Although the state of the law in New York currently is unset-
encouraged. Id.; see Diamond, supra note 7, at 333 (verbal as well as nonverbal cues often
are presented to the subject).
86 N.J. at 546, 432 A.2d at 97. While the Hurd court acknowledged that it may be
easier for a person familiar with the case and investigation to question the witness, the court
nevertheless found the risk of suggestion too great. Id. The detached hypnotist must be
alone with the subject throughout the pre- and posthypnotic interview as well as during the
session itself. Id.
107 Id. at 548-49, 432 A.2d at 98.
108 Id. at 549, 432 A.2d at 98. The leading nature of the questioning, the pressure ex-
erted on the witness by the authorities, and the hypnotist's prior involvement raised the
possibility of suggestiveness that the Hurd court believed continued into the posthypnotic
session. Id. Additionally, the identification was not corroborated by independent evidence.
Id.
lo See, e.g., People v. Smrekar, 68 IMI. App. 3d 379, 388, 385 N.E.2d 848, 855 (App. Ct.
1979); Polk v. State, 48 Md. App. 382, 395-96, 427 A.2d 1041, 1049 (Ct. Spec. App. 1981);
People v. Lucas, 107 Misc. 2d 231, 235-37, 435 N.Y.S.2d 461, 464-65 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1980).
110 107 Misc. 2d 231, 435 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1980).
.. Id., 435 N.Y.S.2d at 462.
12 Id. at 236-37, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 465. The hypnotic session was not videotaped, al-
though it was recorded. Id. at 236 n.1, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 465 n.1. The hypnosis "was adminis-
tered by a police department hypnotist in the presence of detectives directly involved in the
investigation." Id.
... Id. at 237, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 465.
"I Id. The Lucas court explained that in each case the court must examine the proce-
dures as a whole and determine whether the subject was influenced by suggestion. Id. at
236, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 465. The court interpreted the safeguards as mere guidelines, holding
that the reliability of the hypnotic procedure is to be determined by the trial court in its
discretion taking into account the "totality of the circumstances." Id.
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tled,11 5 a lower New York court specified nine procedural safe-
guards.""" In addition to the six measures enunciated in Hurd, the
Lewis court suggested that a mental health professional examine
the subject to ensure "that [he] possesses sufficient judgment, in-
telligence, and reason"; that the hypnotist avoid adding to the sub-
ject's description; and that other evidence be considered, whether
corroborative or tending to challenge the subject's description. 117
These safeguards have been applied by other courts that have em-
phasized the importance of corroboration, by independent evi-
dence, of hypnotically influenced statements,118 and that have held
that the "totality of circumstances" must be considered when de-
termining the reliability of the hypnotic procedures. e19
115 Compare People v. Hughes, 88 App. Div. 2d 17, 21, 452 N.Y.S.2d 929, 932 (4th
Dep't) (posthypnotic testimony per se inadmissible on the basis of a Frye analysis), appeal
granted, 57 N.Y.2d 780, 440 N.E.2d 1348, - N.Y.S.2d - (1982) with People v. Lewis, 103
Misc. 2d 881, 883 427 N.Y.S.2d 177, 179 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1980) (admissibility should
be determined on a case-by-case basis).
116 People v. Lewis, 103 Misc. 2d 881, 427 N.Y.S.2d 177 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1980). In
Lewis, safeguards were enumerated in order to determine whether the clinical psychologist
who had hypnotized the defendant could testify at the defendant's trial. See id. at 882-83,
427 N.Y.S.2d at 179. The psychologist's testimony indicated that the defendant had been
susceptible to pressure from the police when he made inculpatory statements. Id. at 882,
427 N.Y.S.2d at 178. The court held that the psychologist could not testify as to the volun-
tariness of the confession because he had based his evaluation on two interviews, one of
which was a hypnotic session where the enumerated procedures were not followed. See id. at
884-85, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 180. The court believed that since the subject could fabricate under
hypnosis as easily as if he were not hypnotized, the absence of safeguards, especially a re-
cording of the session, rendered the testimony inadmissible. Id. at 883-84, 427 N.Y.S.2d at
179.
117 Id. The additional safeguards articulated by the Lewis court read, in full, as follows:
(6) Prior to induction a mental health professional should examine the sub-
ject to exclude the possibility that the subject is physically or mentally ill and to
confirm that the subject possesses sufficient judgment, intelligence, and reason to
comprehend what is happening.
(8) The specially trained person should strive to avoid adding any new ele-
ments to the subject's description of her/his experience, including any implicit or
explicit cues during the presession contact, the actual hypnosis and the postses-
sion contact.
(9) Consideration should be given to any other evidence tending to corrobo-
rate or challenge the information garnered during the trance or as a result of post-
hypnotic suggestion.
Id.
"1 E.g., State v. Hurd, 173 N.J. Super. 333, 369, 414 A.2d 291, 309 (Super. Ct. Law Div.
1980), aff'd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981).
119 E.g., State v. Hurd, 173 N.J. Super. 333, 369, 414 A.2d 291, 309 (Super. Ct. Law Div.
1980), aff'd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981); People v. Lucas, 107 Misc. 2d 231, 236, 435
N.Y.S.2d 461, 465 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1980); cf. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196, 199
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PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS: ADDRESSING THE OBJECTIONS TO
ADMISSIBILITY
In addition to the argument that hypnosis does not meet the
Frye standard of admissibility, a close examination of the authori-
ties reveals two constitutional objections to admitting posthypnotic
testimony. First, it is argued that pretrial hypnosis results in a de-
nial of the sixth amendment right to confrontation;120 and second,
that hypnosis, in a pretrial identification context amounts to a de-
nial of due process because of the susceptibility to suggestion."
This section of the Article addresses these constitutional objec-
tions, as well as the contention that the Frye standard of admissi-
bility presents an obstacle to admitting hypnotically induced or
enhanced testimony. It will be shown that strict adherence to the
procedural safeguards outlined in the previous section can over-
come the doubts concerning such testimony.
The Frye Standard
Courts applying the Frye analysis have noted that there is a
continuing controversy in the legal and scientific community con-
cerning the reliability of hypnotically enhanced testimony.'22
While it is recognized that such testimony can never be completely
free from doubt,123 it is suggested that the Frye test of general sci-
entific acceptance is misplaced in the context of hypnosis.1 24 Hyp-
(1972) (results of an identification procedure are admissible if under the "totality of the
circumstances" they are reliable, even if there is evidence of suggestiveness); Sales v. Harris,
675 F.2d 532, 537-38 (2d Cir. 1982) (reliability is the primary determinant of whether the
suggestiveness of an identification violates due process).
1" See Note, supra note 50, at 987-1000; Note, supra note 10, at 1221. But see People
v. Diggs, 112 Cal. App. 3d 522, 529-31, 169 Cal. Rptr. 386, 390 (Ct. App. 1980).
21 See, e.g., State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 547-48, 432 A.2d 86, 97-98 (1981); People v.
Hughes, 99 Misc. 2d 863, 871-72, 417 N.Y.S.2d 642, 648-49 (Onondaga County Ct. 1979),
rev'd, 88 App. Div. 2d 17, 452 N.Y.S.2d 929 (4th Dep't), appeal granted, 57 N.Y.2d 780, 440
N.E.2d 1348, - N.Y.S.2d - (1982); State v. White, 26 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2168 (Wis.
Cir. Ct. 1979); Note, supra note 10, at 1218-19.
"I See, e.g., State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 231-32, 624 P.2d 1274, 1279-80 (1981); Polk v.
State, 48 Md. App. 382, 389-96, 427 A.2d 1041, 1046-49 (Ct. Spec. App. 1981); People v.
Tait, 99 Mich. App. 19, 26-28, 297 N.W.2d 853, 856-57 (Ct. App. 1980); State v. Mack, 292
N.W.2d 764, 771-72 (Minn. 1980).
11' See, e.g., People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill. App. 3d 379, 385 N.E.2d 848, 853 (App. Ct.
1979); Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 710, 715, 204 S.E.2d 414, 419 (1974); Diamond,
supra note 7, at 332-49; Herman, supra note 3, at 27; Alsop, Clue That is Buried in the
Subconscious May Crack the Case, Wall St. J., June 27, 1978, at 1, col. 4.
12, See State v. Temoney, 45 Md. App. 569, 577-78, 414 A.2d 240, 244 (Ct. Spec. App.
1980). The Temoney court distinguished expert opinion deduced from hypnosis, which
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nosis, unlike polygraphs, voiceprints and other technological test-
ing devices, does not purport to establish any type of scientific fact
or data. An expert does not render an opinion as to the credibility
of any fact based upon the results of a test. Hypnosis simply is a
method of prompting the recall of information buried within the
mind of the witness. 125 As such, its reliability should be left for
determination by a jury, rather than its admissibility determined
by a Frye analysis.
Properly conducted, hypnosis can elicit an accurate account of
a person's recollection of his or her perceptions, 12 6 although the
original perception may not always be an accurate account of what
occurred.127 Hypnotically evoked recollection thus seems to suffer
from an imperfection no greater than that of recollection achieved
through other methods, and, therefore, appears no more objection-
able.1 28 Indeed, as a method of obtaining historically accurate in-
formation, human recall can be notoriously unreliable.1 2 Rather
than requiring historical accuracy before admitting eyewitness tes-
timony, however, the adversary system is relied upon to inform the
jury of the inherent weakness of the evidence. Thus, hypnotically
enhanced evidence should be admissible in criminal cases if the
trial court finds that the use of hypnosis in a particular situation is
"reasonably likely" to achieve recall "comparable in accuracy to
normal human memory. 13 0 The trier of fact then can decide how
much weight to accord the hypnotically refreshed testimony.131
would be excluded under a Frye analysis, from the hypnotically induced testimony itself,
which it held admissible. Id.
12 See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 7, at 340; Orne, supra note 100, at 317-18; Spector &
Foster, supra note 80, at 613; Spiegel, supra note 5, at 79.
126 See, e.g., Orne, supra note 100, at 317-18, 320; Spector & Foster, supra note 80, at
587-91; Spiegel, supra note 5, at 79.
M See State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. at 541-43, 432 A.2d at 94-95; Spector & Foster, supra
note 80, at 590-91.
I" See Spector & Foster, supra note 80, at 587-91. See generally Marshall, Marquis &
Oskamp, Effects of Kind of Question and Atmosphere of Interrogation on Accuracy and
Completeness of Testimony, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1620, 1628-38 (1971).
11, State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. at 542-43, 432 A.2d at 94-95; see Manson v. Brathwaite, 432
U.S. 98, 116 (1977).
130 See State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. at 543, 432 A.2d at 95.
' Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506, 509 (9th Cir. 1974); Clark v. State,
379 So. 2d 372, 375 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Creamer v. State, 232 Ga. 136, 138, 205 S.E.2d
240, 241-42 (1974); Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 236, 246 A.2d 302, 306 (Ct. Spec. App.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969); State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 120-21, 244 S.E.2d
414, 427-28 (1978); State v. Jorgensen, 8 Or. App. 1, 9, 492 P.2d 312, 315 (Ct. App. 1971);
Spector & Foster, supra note 80, at 586.
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Furthermore, a careful application of the procedural safe-
guards should quell any reservations created by the scientific ob-
jections themselves. While there is substantial controversy in the
legal and scientific communities concerning the propriety of admit-
ting posthypnotic testimony,1 3 2 there is considerable agreement as
to the nature of its inadequacies.1 33 Since these inadequacies are
clearly delineated, it would appear that strict procedures can be
applied to remedy them. For example, the risk of suggestiveness is
reduced when a licensed psychiatrist or clinical psychologist ad-
ministers the hypnosis with no one else present. Additionally, the
requirement that the hypnotist not be involved in the investigation
ensures that even if the witness confabulates his responses, they
will be the product of his own mind, rather than the result of the
hypnotist's prompting or unintentional divulgence of prejudicial
information.13 4 The human memory is an active process and even
the normal workings of the mind can result in inaccurate gap-
filling. 135 Application of the safeguards should result in hypnoti-
cally refreshed memory whose reliability is comparable to that as-
sociated with normal recall, the credence of which is determined
by the jury.
Right to Confrontation
The sixth amendment of the Constitution guarantees a defen-
dant the right to confront his accusers."3 6 Basic to this right is the
opportunity to cross-examine opposing witnesses.3 7 There are few
subjects upon which courts have been in closer agreement than in
their belief that the rights of confrontation and cross-examination
are fundamental requirements for a fair trial.138 Indeed, the Su-
"' See supra note 122 and accompanying text
,33 See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
'3 See Resolution Adopted by the International Society for Hypnosis, 27 INTL J.
CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 453, 453 (1979).
'31 See State v. Long, 649 P.2d 845, 846 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (explaining the "logical
completion mechanism" whereby a person unknowingly fills in gaps in his memory of an
event); Marshall, Evidence, Psychology, and the Trial: Some Challenges to Law, 63 COLUM.
L. REV. 197, 204-08 (1963); Spector & Foster, supra note 80, at 587-89.
136 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
137 See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415,
418-19 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406-07 (1965).
118 See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (describing cross-examination
as "the 'greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth' ") (quoting 5 J. WIG-
MORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
§ 1367 (3d ed. 1940)).
[Vol. 57:30
1982] POSTHYPNOTIC TESTIMONY
preme Court has affirmed prior holdings that sought to preserve
the defendant's sixth amendment rights against undue pretrial ma-
nipulation of witnesses.1"9
One drawback of the hypnotic process is the subject's firm
conviction that what he has recalled under hypnosis is accurate.
140
Because of the high level of suggestibility, any hypnotic suggestion,
intentional or otherwise, could become part of the subject's mem-
ory, regardless of the validity of the particular fact suggested."4
Thus, when a subject has no independent memory, he may recon-
struct or recreate his memory to fit that which previously had been
suggested to him.142 Even when the questioning is free from sug-
gestion, hypnotic subjects tend to fabricate missing details from a
mixture of actual, though unrelated, experiences and fantasy.
1 4 3
When the distorted memory is implanted, the subject usually de-
velops a firm belief in its validity, and the tenacity with which he
relates this belief as a witness is correspondingly enhanced.14 4 This
false confidence may interfere with the jury's proper function in
13, See Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 224-25 (1977). The Moore Court stressed the
danger that a witness who has made an identification will be "predisposed to adhere to this
identification in subsequent testimony at trial." Id. at 225 (citing United States v. Wade,
338 U.S. 218, 229, 235-36 (1967)).
140 See 9 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA Macropaedia 139 (1981). "When recalled in hyp-
nosis, such false memories are accompanied by strong subjective conviction and outward
signs of conviction that are most compelling to almost any observer." Id.
" See Orne, supra note 100, at 327; Putnam, supra note 9, at 444. Putnam questioned
experimental subjects about a videotape they had seen. Id. at 440-41. Those subjects under
hypnosis made significantly more errors in response to leading questions than did the con-
trol group. Id. at 444. Putnam found no difference in accuracy, however, between the two
groups' responses to nonleading questions. Id. at 445.
142 See, e.g., E. HILGARD, supra note 10, at 8-9 ("[r]eality distortions of all kinds, in-
cluding acceptance of falsified memories ... can be accepted without criticism within the
hypnotic state"); see also Diamond, supra note 7, at 314.
143 See Diamond, supra note 7, at 335; Stalnaker & Riddle, The Effect of Hypnosis on
Long Delayed Recall, 6 J. GEN. PSYCH. 429 (1932). In a study conducted more than 50 years
ago, students attempted to recall poems learned 12 months earlier. Under hypnosis, they
recalled more of the original material, but, significantly, they made more mistakes, in some
instances fabricating significant segments of the poem. Id. at 436-37. Clearly, this phenome-
non stems not from dishonesty, but from the hypnotized subject's desire to satisfy the hyp-
notist. See Diamond, supra note 7, at 335. This desire can prod the subject into producing
the detailed, seemingly realistic account that he senses the hypnotist wants. Id. at 337.
The most dramatic illustrations of the hypnotized subject's willingness to "recall"
events that have not occurred are seen in age/progression studies. There, subjects are able to
describe events 10 years in the future with the same confidence and in the detail that they
described past events. Rubenstein & Newman, The Living Out of "Future" Experiences
Under Hypnosis, 119 SCIENCE 472, 473 (1954).
144 See Spiegel, supra note 5, at 78-79.
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evaluating the demeanor of a witness.145 Arguably, a defendant
faced with such a witness is denied his sixth amendment right to
confront his accusers because the witness' original memory is lost
forever.14 The defendant now must face a "new" witness whose
natural recollection may have been altered by suggestion or con-
fabulation, but who nonetheless has a firm conviction as to its
truth. 14 7 Thus, the prosecutor has created, and later will present to
a jury, a sincere, and, hence, more credible witness.
While hypnotically obtained testimony presents some risks to
an accused's sixth amendment rights, the validity of this evidence,
when it is obtained under strictly regulated conditions, is compara-
ble to that resulting from recognized and permissible techniques
for refreshing a witness' recollection. 148 The major concern when
using any form of present memory refreshment is that the witness'
recollection actually may not be revived, but rather, that he merely
will agree with counsel's leading questions or with data contained
in a memorandum. 49 Nonetheless, courts usually will permit a wit-
145 It is well established that a primary objective of the confrontation clause is to allow
the jury to judge the witness' demeanor on the stand and the manner of his delivery. See,
e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895). Following hypnosis, however, the
witness' demeanor may not reflect the honest uncertainties he may have felt as to his natu-
ral recollection, but instead will reflect an artificial confidence. See Diamond, supra note 7,
at 339-40. Professor Diamond asserts that not even a trained expert can determine whether
a hypnotically induced recollection is distorted, as long as the recollection logically is plausi-
ble. See id. at 337, 340. Thus, the jury's ability to interpret the witness' demeanor on the
stand is diminished, if not eliminated.
14' See Diamond, supra note 7, at 336. Professor Diamond proffers:
[Tlime, rather than weakening the effects of the hypnotic distortion, tends if any-
thing to fix it into a permanent pattern. Therefore, the pretrial hypnosis of a wit-
ness appreciably influences all of his subsequent testimony in ways that are
outside the consciousness of the witness and difficult, if not impossible, to detect.
Id.
147 Id. at 335-37. Professor Diamond describes the problem of "posthypnotic source am-
nesia," whereby the subject remembers what he learned in a hypnotic state, but forgets that
he learned it under hypnosis. Id. at 336; see also Spiegel, supra note 5, at 78 (description of
the "honest liar" syndrome).
,41 Comment, supra note 1, at 130. "Refreshing recollection" refers to a witness review-
ing data in order to help him recall the facts of a particular event. C. McCORMIcK, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 9, at 14-15 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972). "Past recollection
recorded" refers to the swearing by a witness that a memorandum was prepared by him and
that he believed it to be accurate at that time. Id.
119 See 3 J. Wo Io, supra note 138, §§ 776-777, at 169. Leading questions may be
asked to aid a witness' memory subject to the court's discretion. Id. It is accepted that the
human memory often can be refreshed when an image or statement associated with the
memory is brought to a witness' attention. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 148, § 9, at 14. It is at
times questionable, however, whether the witness actually recalls the events or merely be-
lieves them to be true because of the written statement. See id. at 16.
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ness' memory to be refreshed or revived, but will retain the author-
ity to determine whether the witness is actually relying on his re-
freshed memory.150 Additionally, the court may deny counsel
permission to proceed if the method's probative value is out-
weighed by the possibility of undue prejudice caused by sugges-
tion.151 Furthermore, the adverse party has the right to examine
any aid employed to enhance recollection, as well as attack the va-
lidity of the aid and the corresponding testimony on cross-
examination. 5
2
It appears that a skillful and vigorous examination of both the
witness and hypnotist should bring any deficiencies in the hypnotic
technique to the attention of the jury. For example, discrepancies
between the witness' pre- and posthypnotic statements provide
fertile ground for investigation and confrontation. Moreover, the
additional confidence in a witness' testimony induced by hypnosis
need not violate a defendant's sixth amendment rights any more
than confidence induced through more conventional and accepted
techniques, such as an attorney's extensive drilling of a witness
before trial.
Several courts properly have permitted the testimony of a wit-
ness whose amnesia has been overcome through hypnosis, reason-
ing that the technique of memory enhancement is a factor to be
considered by the jury,5 3 provided that the facts are related from
the witness' present memory, the hypnotist details the technique
employed, and the opponent has the opportunity to challenge the
reliability of the present memory and the procedures employed to
enhance the recall.1 5 When memory refreshment techniques are
employed, access by opposing counsel at trial to the materials
used, and cross-examination based on those materials, is deemed
sufficient to protect the defendant's constitutional rights.1 55 Thus,
'50 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 148, § 9, at 16-17; see United States v. Conley, 503 F.2d
520, 522 (8th Cir. 1974) (it is within the discretion of the trial court to permit or disallow
the use of an aid to memory).
151 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 148, § 9, at 17.
"' Spivey v. Zant, 683 F.2d 881, 885 n.5 (5th Cir. 1982); see FED. R. Evw. 612 & advi-
sory committee note.
M See, e.g., Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 1975) (citing
Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506, 509 (9th Cir. 1974)); Harding v. State, 5 Md.
App. 230, 236, 246 A.2d 302, 306 (Ct. Spec. App. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969).
1 See Comment, supra note 1, at 132.
155 See FED. R. Evm. 612. Under the federal rules, a defendant's access to a witness'
memory refreshment aid is mandated only when the witness uses the aid on the stand. Id.
advisory committee note. If the aid is used only to refresh his memory before testifying,
19821
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when hypnosis is used to enhance recall, access before trial to the
mandatory recording of the hypnotic session156 and divulgence of
all information received by the hypnotist prior to the session" 7 will
provide greater protection to the defendant since criminal defen-
dants normally are not permitted access to a state witness' pretrial
statements until that witness has testified on direct examination. 58
Access to the records will enable opposing counsel to bring any
procedural irregularities to the attention of the court, and will fur-
nish him with the necessary raw material with which to impeach
the credibility of the witness' recall.
Due Process
It can be argued that the pretrial hypnosis of a witness vio-
lates an accused's right to due process of law because of the sub-
ject's susceptibility to suggestion, and the tendency of a witness to
adhere to an initial statement in later proceedings. It is submitted
that through the implementation of the enumerated procedures,
this danger may be ameliorated to an extent that will ensure the
defendant of his constitutional rights.
The due process analysis as applied to identification proce-
dures provides a useful analogy,'59 since those procedures present
the same dangers of suggestibility'"0 and proclivity to adhere to
allowing opposing counsel access to the aid is within the discretion of the court. Id.; see
Kimbrough v. State, 219 So. 2d 122, 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); State v. Audette, 128 Vt.
374, 377-78, 264 A.2d 786, 788 (1970). But see State v. Bradshaw, 101 R.I. 233, 241, 221 A.2d
815, 819 (1966) (refusal to produce report that witness had consulted before testifying is
reversible error).
158 See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
157 See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
"I See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1976). Section 3500, when applicable, supercedes Federal
Rule of Evidence 612, K. REDDEN & S. SALTZBURG, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 378
(2d ed. 1977), and therefore, "[e]ven though the witness uses a statement to refresh his
recollection prior to testifying, the Judge has no discretion to order production of the state-
ment until after the witness finishes his testimony," id.
'51 See, e.g., State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 232, 624 P.2d 1274, 1280 (1981) (exclusion of
hypnotically induced testimony would further the same goal as excluding tainted eyewitness
identifications); People v. Hughes, 99 Misc. 2d 863, 871, 417 N.Y.S.2d 643, 649 (Onondaga
County Ct. 1979) (hypnosis under the direction of investigators clearly is an identification
procedure), rev'd, 88 App. Div. 2d 17, 452 N.Y.S.2d 929 (4th Dep't), appeal granted, 57
N.Y.2d 780, 440 N.E.2d 1348, - N.Y.S.2d - (1982).
11o Various pretrial identification procedures have been the subject of due process ob-
jection. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 381-82 (1968) (identification from
photographs); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 295-96 (1967) (one-man showup in a hospital
room); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 219-20 (1967) (lineup). The line of Supreme
Court cases exploring the due process implications of identifications before trial has indi-
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earlier statements.161 In a due process analysis of an identification
procedure, courts balance the suggestiveness of the procedure
against the reliability of the identification to determine whether
there is a "very substantial likelihood" that the identification was
inaccurate. 162 This standard does not require the elimination of all
appearances of doubt. Identification procedures will be upheld "so
long as the identification possesses sufficient aspects of reliabil-
ity. 1 63 Similarly, when testimony is hypnotically induced, courts
should make a threshold determination of admissibility based
upon whether the hypnotic testimony was unduly influenced by
suggestion, and thus violative of due process.16 4 Adherence to the
cated that overly suggestive procedures indeed violate the defendant's constitutional rights.
Note, supra note 50, at 992-93. In United States v. Wade, the Court stated, "A major factor
contributing to the high incidence of miscarriage of justice from mistaken identification has
been the degree of suggestion inherent in the manner in which the prosecution presents the
suspects to witnesses for pretrial identification." 388 U.S. at 228.
161 See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383-84 (1968) (when a witness makes
an identification from a photograph, he is likely to retain the image of the photograph
rather than of the criminal); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 229 (1967) (a witness is
not likely to change his mind once he has made an identification).
162 See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 5 (1970); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S.
377, 384 (1968). Factors indicative of a reliable identification include "the opportunity of the
witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the
accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demon-
strated by the witness at the confrontation and the length of time between the crime and
the confrontation." Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972). Indicia of suggestiveness
include the composition of a lineup and the behavior of the police at the confrontation. See
Note, supra note 50, at 986-88. An additional consideration is the necessity of the procedure
used. See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).
163 Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 106 (1977) (footnote omitted); see United
States v. Field, 625 F.2d 862, 866 (9th Cir. 1980).
164 Cf. Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 116 (1977) (with respect to identification
procedures generally, if there is anything "short of a very substantial likelihood of irrepara-
ble misidentification," the testimony is "for the jury to weigh"); Sales v. Harris, 675 F.2d
532, 539 (2d Cir. 1982) (if a "minimum threshold level of reliability" has been met, identifi-
cation testimony is admissible). In the context of a pretrial identification made during a
hypnotic session, the trial judge at the suppression hearing should consider the inherent
suggestiveness of hypnosis, as well as the degree of suggestiveness in the particular instance
in light of the Hurd procedures. Whether the minimum level of reliability has been reached
should be determined through use of the Manson test of "very substantial likelihood of
irreparable misidentification." See Manson, 432 U.S. at 116; supra note 161. In addition, it
should be borne in mind that reliability is not synonymous with accuracy. Rather, it is the
probability that the response would be the same under any circumstance. Note, supra note
50, at 992 n.103. Indeed, the Manson factors serve to determine the quantity and quality of
information the witness has in his memory, and, therefore, could be used to test the
probability of confabulation by the subject. For example, the span of time between the
crime and the hypnosis will determine the extent of memory decay, and whether the holes
in memory will likely be filled while the subject is under hypnosis.
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procedural safeguards should serve to minimize the likelihood of
prejudice in this context. For instance, the requirement that the
hypnotist be independent of the investigation and uninformed
about its progress will reduce the incidence of leading questions.16 5
Additionally, requiring that the hypnotist be alone with the sub-
ject will eliminate the possibility of influence from third parties. In
this manner, the procedural safeguards enhance the reliability of
the testimony, and thereby ensure that due process has not been
violated.
Adherence to due process requirements, it is suggested, can be
secured further through performance of two additional functions.
First, in applying the due process balance, the court should weigh
the necessity of the hypnotic procedure.16 6 If the hypnosis was not
necessary to the procurement of evidence, the subject should not
be permitted to testify regarding the substance6 7 of the hypnotic
165 When the hypnotist has a preconceived idea of the expected responses, his interro-
gation can be tainted and the likelihood of suggestion increased. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525,
538-39, 432 A.2d 86, 92-93 (1981). Subtleties in the hypnotist's manner or voice that would
hardly be noticed in an ordinary courtroom setting, much less considered leading, could
indicate to the witness what responses are expected of him. See id. Consequently, the fewer
preconceptions of the hypnotist, the less risk there is of suggestion. Additionally, an inde-
pendent hypnotist will be less inclined to press the hypnotized subject for an answer he does
not know, thereby reducing the risk of the subject confabulating simply to satisfy the hyp-
notist. Id. at 543, 432 A.2d at 96.
I" See Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 227 (1977) ("unnecessarily suggestive proce-
dures" violate the defendant's right to due process); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690-91
(1972) (appropriate balance must be struck between the needs of the investigators and the
rights of the defendant); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 385 (1968) (compelling
nature of the procedure used justifies its use); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967)
(imperative nature of situation may balance in favor of admission of the testimony).
' There is some controversy as to whether a witness whose testimony was excluded
because of hypnosis can testify regarding the substance of what he recalled prior to hypno-
sis. State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 644 P.2d 1279, 1279 (Ariz. 1982) (en banc) (sup-
plemental opinion). In Collins, the Arizona Supreme Court reiterated its rule of per se inad-
missibility for hypnotically induced recall testimony, but held that a previously hypnotized
witness could testify about "those matters which he or she was able to recall and relate prior
to hypnosis." Id. at 1295 (emphasis in original) Although the court acknowledged the dan-
gers to the defendant's sixth amendment rights, it reasoned that the benefit of such testi-
mony outweighed the risk and that an adequate record of the prehypnotic statements would
enable the court to confine the testimony to prehypnotic recall. Id. at 1296; see also People
v. Wallach, 110 Mich. App. 37, 72-73, 312 N.W.2d 387, 404-05 (Ct. App. 1981); State v.
Palmer, 210 Neb. 206, 218, 313 N.W.2d 648, 655 (1981).
In Palmer, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that a witness may not testify as to the
"subject matter" of the hypnotic session, but his testimony as to "other subjects" may be
admissible. 210 Neb. at 218, 313 N.W.2d at 655. Clearly, this approach presents problems
for courts in delineating the various "subjects." The concurrence in Palmer adopted the
view that testimony concerning recollections made prior to hypnosis should be admissible.
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session.' 68 This would have the conjunctive effect of discouraging
prosecutorial abuse of the hypnosis technique. Second, a greater
level of corroboration should be required in hypnosis cases to
countervail the increased level of suggestibility.
As with motions to suppress other types of pretrial procedures
claimed to be unduly suggestive, a court ruling on a motion to sup-
press the testimony of a previously hypnotized witness should de-
cide the issue on the basis of the overall quality of the procedures
employed." 9 Since the safeguards require that the defendant be
given a complete record of the hypnotic session, as well as any
other witness contacts with the hypnotist,170 any due process objec-
tion to the procedures can be expeditiously presented to the court.
CONCLUSION
While hypnosis as a device to enhance witness recall remains
problematic, understanding of hypnosis on the part of the scien-
tific and therapeutic communities is increasing. Moreover, such
employment of hypnosis may expose valuable, albeit potentially
unreliable, evidence that otherwise would remain undisclosed. The
potential unreliability of this evidence, however, seems no more
perilous than that resulting from other methods of inducing wit-
ness recall. Hence, in the essential balance between the necessity
for all relevant evidence and such evidence's reliability, post-
hypnotic testimony appears deserving of a place in criminal juris-
prudence. Indeed, although hypnosis bears a degree of imperfec-
Id. at 219, 313 N.W.2d at 655 (Clinton, J., concurring); see State v. Koehler, 312 N.W.2d
108, 110 (Minn. 1981) (permitting testimony as to matters "unequivocally disclosed" before
hypnosis).
I" See State v. Long, 32 Wash. App. 732, 737, 649 P.2d 845, 847 (Ct. App. 1982). The
recommendation to consider the necessity of the hypnosis is aimed at preventing prosecu-
tors from using hypnosis to strengthen a witness or to change his story rather than to re-
fresh his memory. One factor to be considered in deciding whether the hypnosis was neces-
sary is the stage in the investigatory process at which the hypnosis was performed. See id.,
649 P.2d at 847. If the hypnosis was performed close to the time of the trial, after the
investigation was completed, the court may infer that its purpose was not the development
of facts, but instead the manipulation of the witness. See id.
149 People v. Lucas, 107 Misc. 2d 231, 236, 435 N.Y.S.2d 461, 465 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1980); State v. Hurd, 173 N.J. Super. 333, 369, 414 A.2d 291, 309 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980),
aff'd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981); cf. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196 (1972) (whether
identification procedures are too suggestive is to be determined "on the totality of the cir-
cumstances"); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967) (a due process violation of a con-
frontation depends on the "totality of the circumstances surrounding it").
170 State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 546, 432 A.2d 86, 97 (1981).
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tion, any obstacle to its admissibility appears scaleable with the
aid of procedural safeguards.
